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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
I. NOTICE Or T=E AccmaN
Failure to give an employer written notice of an injury within
the 30-day statutory period1 occurred in Sanders v. Richardson.2
The claimant brought an action against his employer for injuries
sustained in the course of employment, asserting that he was in-
jured while lifting a heavy bag of mortar mix on a Monday. He
missed work on Tuesday, then worked Wednesday, Thursday,
and Friday. Not until Friday did he mention his malady to his
employer, and even then he described it only as "a kind of hurt-
ing in my side and in my back.. ." which he attributed to hemor-
rhoids. Thus the claimant failed to tell his employer how, when,
or where he sustained the injury. The circuit court affirmed the
Industrial Commission's award to the claimant by deciding that
the employer had notice of claimant's injury even though writ-
ten notice had not been given within thirty days.
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, since no evidence
supported the finding that Sander's employer had actual notice
of the accident. The employer knew that his employee was hav-
ing some sort of physical difficulty, but that was insufficent to
support a claim that the employer, within thirty days after oc-
currence of the accident, had knowledge of the lifting incident
in which the claimant hurt his back.3
Failure to give written notice within the statutory period re-
appeared in Dawkins v. Capitol Construction Co.4 In this case,
however, the opposite conclusion was reached. The claimant,
Colie Dawkins, injured his ankle while working for the defend-
ant. Immediately Dawkins orally informed his employer of the
nature, place, and time of the injury, but neither the claimant nor
his employer sought medical attention for the wounded ankle.
1. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-301 (1962) provides in part:
Every injured employee . .. shall ... give .. . a written notice
of the accident . . . [b]ut no compensation shall be payable unless
such written notice is given within thirty days after the occurrence
of the accident ... unless reasonable excuse is made to the satis-
faction of the Commission . . . and the Commission is satisfied
that the employer has not been prejudiced thereby.
2. 251 S.C. 325, 162 S.E.2d 257 (1968).
3. Accord, Teigue v. Appleton Co., 221 S.C. 52, 68 S.E2d 878 (1952).
4. 167 S.E.2d 439 (S.C. 1969).
1
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Despite the requirement of Section 72-301,5 written notice of the
accident was not given to the employer until disability resulted
five months after the accident. In the initial action, compensa-
tion had been awarded the claimant by the commission, affirmed
by circuit court, and appealed by the employer. The supreme
court had ruled that the accident was the proximate cause of
claimant's disability but remanded the case to the Industrial
Commission to find whether the failure to file written notice
within thirty days was reasonably excusable and whether pre-
judice resulted to the defendant from such failure. 6
After hearing voluminous testimony, the commission found
that:
The Defendants cannot and have not shown any pre-
judice by failure of Claimant to furnish a written report
within the thirty day period. The [employer] admitted
having knowledge of the accident shortly after it hap-
pened...; that said knowledge, being as full of the per-
tinent facts as would have been disclosed by a written
notice, is reasonable excuse to the satisfaction of this
Commission for the failure of the employee to give writ-
ten notice and the employer has not been prejudiced
thereby.7
The award to claimant at this second hearing was affirmed by
the circuit court, and the employer again appealed.
Appellant contended, upon two exceptions, that there was no
evidence to support findings of either reasonable excuse or lack
of prejudice." With respect to reasonable excuse, the supreme
court noted that even the employer testified to having actual
knowledge within moments after the accident of every pertinent
fact which written notice would have been required to disclose.9
5. S.C. CODE ANN. (1962), set out at note 1, supra. The 30-day period
begins to run on the occurrence of the accident, not the onset of the disability.
6. Dawkins v. Capitol Const. Co., 250 S.C. 406, 158 S.E.2d 651 (1967).
Sec also Worknc's Compensation, 1968 Survey of South Carolina Law, 20
S.C.L. REv. 678, 679-80 (1968).
7. Record at 87.
8. Brief for Appellant at 7-12.
9. On cross-examination the employer testified as follows:
Q. Mr. Medlin, there's no doubt about it, that... very shortly
after Colic got hurt, you knew that he had had something happen
to his foot?
A. Yes sir.
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Therefore, the commission's conclusion that there was a reason-
able excuse for the claimant's failure to give written notice with-
in thirty days was amply supported by the evidence.
With reference to prejudice, the court declared South Carolina
law settled that the burden of proving prejudice is upon the em-
ployer.'10 Moreover, the decisions of the supreme court show that
an employer cannot claim prejudice where its knowledge of the
pertinent facts was as full as that it would have gained by a writ-
ten notice." Consequently the employer failed to prove pre-
judice, and claimant's award was affirmed.
An examination of Sanders and Dawkins reveals that failure
to comply with the statutory written notice requirement does not
bar the possibility of compensation so long as the employer learns
as much about the nature, place, and time of the injury as a writ-
ten report would have disclosed.
II. POST-INjuiY EAtNINGs
One of the most interesting workmen's compensation issues
during the survey period caused a division in the South Carolina
Supreme Court. In Owens v. Herndom2 the claimant, after sus-
taining a compensable back injury, returned to his job at the same
rate of pay as before the accident. During the next two years he
changed jobs twice, one time by concealing his injury. Although
his hourly pay increased by more than a dollar during that time,
he lost an average of three days per month because of his back
injury. The pain caused him by continuing to work might ordi-
narily have prevented him from working altogether were it not
for his wife's poor health. His fellow employees covered for him
when he was unable to lift or do heavy work.
The hearing commission found a thirty per cent permanent
physical impairment and ordered the defendant to pay accord-
ingly. On appeal by the employer, the full commission agreed
Q. And you also knew that he did get hurt there on the drag-
line?
A. Yes sir. The connection between the leads.
Record at 47-48.
10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-302 (1962). See also Strawhorn v. J.A. Chapman
Const. Co., 202 S.C. 43, 24 S.E2d 116 (1943).
11. See, e.g., Mize v. Sangamo Elec. Co., 251 S.C. 250, 161 S.E.2d 846
(1968); Ricker v. Villager Management Corp., 231 S.C. 47, 97 S.E.2d 83
(1957) ; Raley v. City of Camden, 222 S.C. 303, 72 S.E.2d 572 (1952) ; Teigue
v. Appleton Co., 221 S.C. 52, 68 S.E.2d 878 (1952); Strawhorn v. J.A. Chap-
man Const. Co., 202 S.C. 43, 24 S.E.2d 116 (1943).
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that Owens had sustained such an impairment, but found no dis-
ability within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act
in that he had suffered no diminution in wages.13 The circuit
court reversed, reinstating the award of the hearing commis-
sioner.
The South Carolina Supreme Court, two justices dissenting,
reversed the circuit court order and restored the Industrial Com-
mission's decision denying compensation. The majority cited
Section 72-10 of the South Carolina Code which defines "dis-
ability" as "incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which
the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or
any other employment." The majority asserted that disability is
to be measured solely by the employee's capacity to earn the
wages he was receiving at the time of his injury. There is no
recognition of pain and suffering, or of increased discomfort and
difficulty in working.' 4 Since the claimant's post-injury wages
actually increased, he had suffered no disability under the Act
and hence was ineligible for compensation.
The two dissenters, Justices Bussey and Lewis, contended that
the case should be remanded to the Industrial Commission for
further findings. They found the case to be factually distingu-
ishable from prior decisions' 5 wherein compensation was denied
on the basis of post-injury earnings, and thought the question
presented to be of novel impression. The dissenting justices felt
that the court's holding made post-injury earnings which hap-
pened to exceed those before the injury legally conclusive against
a finding of impaired earning capacity.
Justice Bussey distinguished earlier South Carolina cases in
which a claimant who earned as much or more after the accident
was denied compensation by noting that in none of them had an
actual diminution in earning capacity been shown. Far from re-
quiring the majority's result, prior worknen's compensation deci-
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-152 (1962) provides in part:
[W]hen the incapacity for work resulting from the injury is
partial, the employer shall pay... to the injured employee during
such disability a weekly compensation equal to sixty per cent of
the difference between his average weekly wages before the injury
and the average weekly wages which he is able to earn thereafter,
but not more than, thirty-five dollars a week.
(Emphasis added.)
14. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-152 (1962).
15. Shealy v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 250 S.C. 106, 156 S.E.2d 646 (1967);
Keeter v. Clifton Mfg. Co., 225 S.C. 389, 82 S.E.2d 520 (1954); Parrott v.
Barfield Used Parts, 206 S.C. 381, 34 S.E.2d 802 (1945).
[Vol. 21
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [1969], Art. 16
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol21/iss4/16
WORKMEIN'S COm'PNSATION SURVEYED
sions uniformly recognized capacity to earn as the criterion for
assessing disability. Finding no South Carolina case putting this
principle to the acid test posed by a finding of higher post-acci-
dent earnings, Justice Bussey examined the law in other juris-
dictions. He found it to be "uniformly held.., that a finding of
disability may stand even where there is evidence of actual post-
injury earnings equaling or exceeding those received before the
accident."'  Thus the Industrial Commission could consider -
indeed shouZd consider - all the facts pertaining to the claimiant's
earning capacity, not merely wages made between accident and
hearing. The dissenters thought it clear that Owens "suffered an
actual loss of earning capacity in that he is earning less money
than he would be earning were it not for his injury."17
As the authorities18 cited by the dissenters show, the court
seems to have construed Section 72-10 so as to require a result
which seems practically unknown outside South Carolina: in-
creased post-injury earnings preclude a finding of impaired earn-
ing capacity.
III. AmsING OUT OF EM LOYMENT
The question of whether any competent evidence supported the
Industrial Commission's finding that the deceased's fatal heart
attack arose "out of and in the course of [his] employment" 1 9
was the sole issue in MoFAhorter v. South Carolina Department
of Insurance.20 In that case the deceased, Harold McWhorter,
was employed by the defendant in a largely sedentary job as an
investigator. Before his death McWhorter was required to inves-
tigate an involved case requiring him to interview and confer with
a large number of witnesses from all over the state. In conduct-
ing these interviews the decedent traveled more than fifteen
hundred miles and worked more than one hundred twenty-one
hours during a ten-day period preceding trial. During that time
he was operating under extreme pressure, emotional strain and
worry.21 On Saturday and Sunday before the trial, normally
16. 165 S.E.2d at 701, quoting 2 A. LAnsoN, WoRRMEN's Comp0ENSAnoN
LAv § 57.21 (1968). To the same effect is 11 W. SCHNEMER, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATioN § 2305 (1957). See also Annot., 149 A.L.R. 413, 415 (1944).
17. 165 S.E2d at 701.
18. See note 16 supra.
19. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 72-14 (1962) provides in part: "Injury shall mean
only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employ-
ment .... "
20. 165 S.E.2d 365 (S.C. 1969).
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days off, the deceased worked eleven and twelve hours respec-
tively.22 On the day of the trial, he arose at 3:30 a.m. to drive to
Columbia to Greenville for the trial. When the court recessed for
lunch, McWhorter, who had no previous history of a heart condi-
tion, suffered a fatal heart attack. The defendant appealed from
an award of the South Carolina Industrial Commission, affirmed
by the circuit court, in favor of the deceased's wife.
On appeal the employer relied heavily on the case of Pellumr
v. W.C. Chaplin Transport.23 In that case the deceased, who had
been employed as a truck driver, also suffered a heart attack al-
legedly from overexertion. The South Carolina Supreme Court
in denying the claimant a compensation award stated: "It is usual
for the driver of a petroleum truck to have additional work dur-
ing cold weather and less work in other seasons, and this is to be
expected. 24 The appellant, attempting to analogize Pellum to
the instant case, contended that it was usual for an investigator
to work more on some cases than on others, that the investigation
of this particular case was a condition of his employment, and
that long hours as such could not be "twisted into an accident."
25
In a per euriam decision, the Supreme Court of South Caro-
lina affirmed the circuit court order granting the claimant bene-
fits under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The court felt that
the case at bar came squarely within the doctrine laid down in
several prior cases 26 that:
"the right to compensation is not affected by the fact
that the unusual or excessive strain which precipitates
the heart attack occurs while the employee is performing
work of the same general type as that in which he is reg-
ularly involved," and that, "the phrase 'unusual or ex-
cessive strain' used in many of the cases, is not so limited
in its meaning as to include only work of an entirely dif-
ferent character than that customarily done."
27
Unusually long hours, great mental stress, emotional involve-
22. Id. at 60-62.
23. 249 S.C. 384, 154 S.E.2d 432 (1967).
24. Id. at 351, 154 S.E.2d at 433 (emphasis added).
25. Brief for Appellant at 7.
26. Walsh v. United States Rubber Co., 238 S.C. 411, 120 S.E.2d 685
(1961); Kearse v. South Carolina Wildlife Resources Dep't, 236 S.C. 540,
115 S.E.2d 183 (1960); Wynn v. Peoples Natural Gas of S.C., 238 S.C. 1,
118 S.E,2d 812 (1961).
27. 165 S.E.2d at 368, quoting Walsh v. United States Rubber Co., 238 S.C.
411, 417-18, 120 S.E.2d 685, 689 (1961).
[Vol. 21
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ment, lack of sleep, time pressure, physical exertion, and other
extraordinary work conditions convinced the court that the In-
dustrial Commission's finding of an accident arising from em-
ployment was supported by competent evidence.
IV. ADDITIONAL MEDIcAL TREATmENT
In Williams v. Boyle Constmtion (70.28 the claimant's com-
pensable injury produced a paraplegic condition which the In-
dustrial Commission found resulted in total and permanent dis-
ability. The employer accepted liability for medical expenses in-
curred during the first ten weeks after the injury but denied lia-
bility thereafter.29 When the commission awarded medical ex-
penses beyond the ten-week period referred to in the statute, the
employer successfully appealed to the circuit court.
In reversing the circuit court and reinstating claimant's award
for continuing medical treatment, the South Carolina Supreme
Court referred to the controlling provision of Section 72-305: the
employer is not liable for medical care beyond ten weeks unless
it "will tend to lessen the period of disability .... "30
The court then noted that the finding of fact by the Industrial
Commission that the medical treatment in question would tend to
lessen the period of disability is binding if there is any compe-
tent evidence reasonably tending to support it. The court's in-
quiry was therefore limited to whether such competent evidence
existed.
28. 166 S.E.2d 550 (S.C. 1969).
29. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-305 (1962) provides in part:
The refusal of an employee to accept any medical . . . treatment
when provided by the employer or ordered by the Commission
shall bar such employee from further compensation until such re-
fusal ceases and no compensation shall. . . be paid for the period
of suspension unless in the opinion of the Commission the circum-
stance justified the refusal ....
30. The statute goes on to say that "[iln case of a controversy arising
between employer and employee, the Commission may order such further medical
... treatment as may in the discretion of the Commission be necessary." S.C.
CODE ANN. § 72-305 (1962). Without much elaboration the court chose to
limit the discretion thus vested to cases in which care beyond ten weeks would
likewise "tend to limit the period of disability." The holding that the clause
quoted above adds nothing to the commission's power is probably more
significant than the actual disposition made in the instant case. In contrast
to its approach in Owens, discussed supra, in which the court ignored authority
from other jurisdictions supporting a liberal interpretation of § 72-10, the
court in Williams sought cases from other states to buttress its narrow reading
of § 72-305: Millwood v. Firestone Cotton Mills, 215 N.C. 519, 2 S.E.2d 560
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After carefully examining the record the court concluded that
the claimant had responded favorably to the treatment thus far
afforded him and that evidence that further medical treatment
might well restore him to a state of self-sufficiency supported the
finding of the Industrial Commission. Thus the commission's
award was sustained.
V. REFusAL OF MEDicAL Am
In Ford v. Allied Chemical Corp.31 the claimant, Andrew F.
Ford, sustained an injury to his head and neck while working
for the defendant. The company's physician, a general practi-
tioner, enlisted the aid of an orthopedic surgeon in treating Ford.
After a few days' hospitalization, the two advised him to return
to work. When Ford came back to the orthopedist four days
later complaining of neck pains and severe headaches, he was told
to take some aspirin and go back to work. Another routine ap-
pointment was set up to see both physicians the following week,
but claimant's worsening condition prompted him to consult an-
other orthopedist on his own intiative the next day. This ortho-
pedist concluded that Ford was definitely disabled and required
prolonged treatment. Ford therefore placed himself under this
physician's care and did not keep the routine appointments with
either of the company's doctors. Claimant was not declared ready
to return to work for ten more weeks.
A compensation award by the Industrial Commission for tem-
porary total disability was affirmed by the circuit court. On ap-
peal the employer argued that the claimant had refused to accept
the medical treatment offered, thereby losing his right to com-
pensation.32
Responding to this contention, the supreme court noted that the
company's general practitioner admittedly had done all he
thought he could for the claimant, 3 and the only treatment that
Ford refused from the company's orthopedic surgeon was the of-
fer of another routine appointment. The company did not con-
tradict the evidence that claimant was in real need of effective
medical treatment. The court concluded that the commission's
31. 167 S.E.2d 564 (S.C. 1969).
32. Brief for Appellant at 8-12. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 72-305 (1962) provides
in part: "The refusal of an employee to accept any . . . treatment when pro-
vided by the employer or ordered by the Commission shall bar such employee
from further compensation . . . unless in the opinion of the Commission the
circumstances justified the refusal ... .
33. Record at 33-34.
[Vol. 21
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [1969], Art. 16
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol21/iss4/16
WO6] EN'S COMPENSATION SURVEYED
finding that claimant either did not refuse medical treatment of-
fered by his employer or was justified in doing so was adquately
supported by the evidence. Accordingly, the claimant's award
was affirmed.
VI. CONSEQUENCES OF THE INJURY
In Turner v. Campbell Soup Co.34 the supreme court directed
the Industrial Commission on remand to find whether the effects
of the employee's injury were connected with the employment.
The cla'imant had sustained a concussion when she fell and struck
her head at work. The Industrial Commission found that her
employment did not cause the fall and denied compensation. The
circuit court reversed and remanded the case to the commission
only to determine the proper compensation due the claimant. The
circuit court's decision was predicated on the principle enunciated
in Bagwell v. Ernest Burwell, Inc.:36
It must be conceded that the deceased's fall occurred in
the course of his employment but this alone furnishes no
basis for an award. It must be further shown either that
the cause of the fall or of the resuZting injury bore some
special relation to his work or to the conditions under
which it was performed.
Our conclusion that claimant has failed to show any
causal connection between the fall of deceased and his
employment does not . . . end our inquiry. There re-
mains for determination whether the fall bore with it
such consequences as would not have occurred except for
the employment.3 6
Accordingly the supreme court observed that even though the
Industrial Commission found that the fall was unrelated to
claimant's employment, the inquiry did not end at that point.
The commission should have further discovered whether the con-
sequences of the fall would not have occurred but for the em-
ployment. The supreme court emphasized that the circuit court
correctly remanded the case to the commission but erred in con-
cluding "as a matter of fact and law" that the employment was
related to the consequences of the fall. Hence, the court called for
additional testimony bearing on any causal connection between
the consequences of the fall and the employment of the claimant.
34. 166 S.E2d 817 (S.C. 1969).
35. 227 S.C. 444, 88 S.E.2d 611 (1955).
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VII. LEGIsLArioN
The sections37 of the South Carolina Code which establish the
legal rights of an injured employee, his employer (and the em-
ployer's insurer), and a third party tort-feasor have been re-
placed.38 Although the new act is too complex for examination
in this survey, it may be noted that it provides much more de-
tailed rules governing the situation described than did the old
code sections.
DoNALD V. Mms
37. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 72-123 to -126 (1962).
38. R506, July 1, 1969.
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